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The Death of the Overreaction Anomaly? 
A Multifactor Explanation of Contrarian Returns 
 
The debate surrounding investor overreaction and contrarian investing is one of the most 
extensive and controversial areas of research in finance.  Despite the fact that there is a 
general agreement on the evidence of price reversal, there is no consensus about what is 
driving these reversals.  From an investment management perspective, the concern regarding 
contrarian strategies relates to issues of portfolio risk and the ability of the anomaly to 
generate alpha.  In the spirit of recent work scrutinizing or ‘dissecting’ anomalies (see Fama 
and French, 2006), we revisit the overreaction anomaly reported by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), updating the initial study with a further two decades of data.  Using a multifactor asset 
pricing framework, we find that contrarian returns, particularly past ‘losers’, consistently load 
on size and the value factors at economically meaningful levels (with past ‘winners’ loading 
predominantly on the value factor).  It is our conjecture that investors following such a 
scheme are simply compensated for the inherent portfolio risk held. 
 
THE OVERREACTION CONTROVERSY 
 
The overreaction anomaly, evidenced by long-term reversals in stock returns, was first 
identified by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who showed that stocks which perform poorly in 
the past three to five years demonstrate superior performance over the next three to five years 
compared to stocks that have performed well in the past.  The original study performed by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), hereafter DT, entitled “Does the stockmarket overreact?”, provided 
evidence that abnormal excess returns could be gained by employing a strategy of buying past 
losers and selling short past winners, or the ‘contrarian’ strategy.  Using an array of data for 
different time periods and in different markets, support for the findings of DT has been 
provided by, among others, Howe (1986), Fama and French (1988), Poterba and Summers 
(1988), Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) and Campbell and Limmack (1997). 
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Soon after the publication of DT, Chan (1988) argued that the work lacked appropriate risk 
adjustment, and demonstrated that the single-factor CAPM had some explanatory power for 
the returns generated by DT.  As asset pricing models developed, Fama and French (1993, 
1995, and 1996) showed the relevance of size and value factors in explaining the cross-
section of stock returns, however, to this day overreaction studies continue to ignore this work 
in their methodological approach to the anomaly.  This appears to be a vital concern, and one 
which this work seeks to rectify.  Further consideration of the literature following DT reveals 
that overreaction studies are subject to a number of criticisms.  First, there is a lack of risk 
adjustment in the original study (Chan, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989).  Second, the impact of 
the January effect on returns is not adequately dealt with (Zarowin, 1990).  Finally, there is an 
ongoing discussion around the role of measurement biases in the sorting and testing periods 
(Conrad & Kaul, 1993).  Our paper directly considers the impact of each of these issues for 
the U.S. setting from 1926 through 2003 (a further two decades of data following DT’s 
observation window), finding that, on risk-adjusted basis, no statistically significant alpha can 
be garnered through the various approaches that attempt to exploit the overreaction anomaly. 
 
To analyse the evidence for long-term reversals, we use the monthly return data from the 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the same data set used in the original DT 
study, for the period of January 1926 through December 2003 and build portfolios every 
period of the best (winner) and worst (loser) performing stocks in the previous n months.  The 
equally-weighted CRSP market index is used as our market proxy (a description of the sorting 
approach is provided in Figure 1, Appendix A.)  We then record the cumulative average 
monthly return to these self-financing portfolios over our sample period. 
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DECOMPOSING CONTRARIAN RETURNS 
 
A. Out-of-sample test of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
The results from the recent sub-period (1983-2003) provide corroborating evidence of the 
overreaction hypothesis, and, interestingly, demonstrate that the magnitude of the anomaly, 
on a risk-unadjusted basis, has actually increased through time.  During the period January 
1983 to December 2003, the loser portfolios outperform the market, on average, by 53.7%, 36 
months after formation.  The winner portfolios underperform the market by, on average, 
4.03%.  These results are displayed in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2
Average CAR of portfolios formed for three-year sort and test periods 
for recent sub-period January 1983 and December 2003 
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Examining the full dataset from 1926 to 2003 shows amplification of the anomaly on a risk-
unadjusted basis, and reveals that if DT were to present the results of their study today, they 
would report a difference in the ACAR’s of the winner and loser portfolios of 42.5%, over 
50% larger than that reported in 1985!  This amplification of the overreaction anomaly 
suggests that suggests that the overreaction anomaly is, perhaps, ‘alive and well’. 
 
B. Evidence in Favour of Risk Adjustment 
Understandably, DT has been extensively criticized for focusing on market-adjusted returns.  
By any metric, portfolio managers are constantly focusing on the risk-adjusted return of their 
investments.  Hence, the core of our study applies various techniques to adjust for risk using 
four techniques: first, by appraising a suitable asset pricing model; second, through an 
investigation of the appropriateness of beta estimates; third; by allowing for the well accepted 
return premium to small companies; and, finally, considering the results in light of the 
January effect.1
 
. 
In examining overreaction, Chan (1988) proposes that the risks of winner and loser stocks do 
not remain constant over the combined time period of sorting and testing.2
                                                 
1 A summary of the size effect is provided by Schwert (1983), with further detail in Banz (1981), Reginganum (1981).  Keim 
(1983), Reginganum (1983) and Haug and Hirschey (2006) provide a discussion of the January effect. 
  This line of 
argument suggests that striking changes in the risks of the portfolios, which are not accounted 
for in the DT study, assist in explaining the returns from the strategy.  Research by such as 
Chan (1988), Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) show that the 
when beta is estimated on the appropriate test period, rather than the formation period, the 
strategy earns economically insignificant abnormal returns.  Using this method, we model the 
time-varying risk coefficients in the data, with the results presented in Table 1.  Our results 
corroborate the findings of earlier work, for all time periods examined, and hence the asset 
pricing tests for our study are run with the coefficients estimated from the test period. 
2 The premise of the criticisms in Chan’s (1988) paper are that if beta is estimated in the sort-period an there is no attempt to 
model changes in risk, the estimated beta will be a biased estimate of the beta in the test-period. Since the risk of the loser 
portfolio increases in the sort-period, the sort-period beta underestimates the test-period beta. 
7 
 
Table I 
Risk-Change Test for a 35 stock portfolio against an index constructed from the CRSP dataset 
for the period 1926 – 2003. 
Tests for abnormal returns under the assumption that the sort-period and test-period betas are not 
equal  Intercept estimates with t-statistics from the Chan (1988) model: 
(Ri,t - Rft) = α1,i(1−D) +α2,iDt + β1,i(Rmt - Rft)(1-D)+ β2,i( Rmt - Rft)Dt + εi,t.   
T-statistics are in parentheses.  Statistical significance is denoted at: 1% - **;   5% - *; 10% - #.   
Sort Period Test Period 
Losers 
α αi βi βiD Adj R2 
3 3 -0.038** 0.002 1.028** 0.417* 0.753 
  (-5.324) (-0.026) (10.377) (2.505)  
4 4 -0.032** 0.004 1.044** 0.307* 0.731 
  (-5.209) (0.344) (12.260) (2.060)  
5 5 -0.024** 0.005 1.088** 0.305 0.667 
  (-3.710) (0.409) (10.379) (1.730)  
Sort Period Test Period 
Winners 
α αi βi βiD Adj R2 
3 3 0.045** -0.003 1.707** -0.473* 0.806 
  (6.025) (-0.422) (15.285) (-2.047)  
4 4 0.036** -0.004 1.632** -0.389* 0.810 
  (5.928) (-0.791) (17.392) (-2.161)  
5 5 0.033** -0.003 1.395** -0.170 0.699 
    (4.817) (-0.623) (13.044) (-0.875)   
 
C. Evidence in Favour of the Three-Factor Model 
The work of Fama and French (1993, 1996) has demonstrated the relevance of size and value 
factors when pricing risky assets.  Investment managers are justly mystified as to why 
researchers over the last decade continue to ignore this in their methodological approach to 
the anomaly.3
 
  This study implements the three-factor model developed by Fama and French 
(1993) (hereafter FF) on the original dataset used by DT, both in-sample and out-of-sample.  
We consider performance with the following equation: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] titititftmiitfti HMLSMBRRRR ,,,,, εησβα +++−+=−  (1) 
                                                 
3 A view held by Bowman and Iverson (1998), Bauman et al. (1999), Schiereck et al. (1999), Gaunt (2000), Kang et al. 
(2002), Forner and Marhuenda (2003), Hirschey (2003), Lai et al. (2003) and Ma et al. (2005). 
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Table II 
Three-Factor Regressions of Performance for a 50 stock portfolio 
against a geometric average index, 1926-2003. 
Fama French 3-factor regressions for monthly excess returns on equal-weighted CRSP 
portfolios of 50 stocks formed on the basis of past returns: Non-overlapping portfolios for the 
period January 1926 to December 2003.  Intercept estimates with t statistics (the regression 
coefficient divided by its standard error) from the Fama French 3-Factor model: 
(Rit - Rft) = αi + βi(Rmt - Rft) + σSMBt + ηHMLt + εi,t. 
The regression R2’s are adjusted for the degrees of freedom.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  
Statistical significance is denoted at: 1% - **;   5% - *; 10% - #.   
Sort Period Test Period 
Losers 
α βi σSMB ηHML Adj R2 
3 3 0.002 1.173** 0.695# 0.648* 0.784 
  (-0.132) (7.954) (1.677) (2.328)  
3 4 0.005 0.954** 1.546** 0.870** 0.744 
  (0.334) (8.386) (6.381) (3.481)  
3 5 0.002 0.993** 1.644** 0.944** 0.733 
  (0.026) (8.654) (7.736) (4.752)  
4 5 0.001 1.216** 0.558* 0.643** 0.783 
  (0.011) (9.925) (2.333) (2.978)  
5 5 0.002 1.142** 0.504* 0.595** 0.773 
  (0.226) (9.392) (1.977) (2.869)  
Sort Period Test Period 
Winners 
α βi σSMB ηHML Adj R2 
3 3 -0.002 1.112** -0.103 -0.338* 0.857 
  (-0.474) (12.329) (-0.952) (-1.965)  
3 4 -0.003 1.201** 0.809** 0.092 0.874 
  (-0.835) (14.496) (5.564) (1.110)  
3 5 -0.002 1.159** 0.679** 0.080 0.888 
  (-0.559) (18.338) (6.227) (1.359)  
4 5 -0.002 1.153** -0.310** -0.295* 0.893 
  (-0.677) (18.398) (-2.636) (-2.564)  
5 5 -0.002 1.171** -0.293* -0.296* 0.889 
    (-0.761) 17.628 (-2.270) (-2.350)   
 
Table II shows that the three-factor model does an admirable job of explaining the return 
behavior of the contrarian portfolios.  For the loser portfolios, we obtained uniformly positive, 
statistically significant loadings on both the size and value factors.  For the winner portfolios, 
the size and value coefficients are, on the whole, statistically significant and negative.  These 
findings suggest that long-term past losers tend to be small, distressed stocks and that the 
winner portfolios comprise larger, growth stocks and therefore the three-factor model predicts 
that the long-term past winners will necessarily not produce higher average returns.4
                                                 
4 Analysis of the two sub-periods presents similar results to those detailed for the full study. 
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Importantly for our study, the FF model is doing a better job than the CAPM (results not 
shown) in explaining the future returns generated by a contrarian strategy.5
 
  The average R2 
for the loser portfolios is 0.769 for the three-factor model, up from 0.648 in our single-factor 
results.  Similarly, the winner portfolios the average R2 increases from 0.831 in the CAPM 
model to 0.882 in the three-factor model. 
D. Evidence of the January Effect 
The findings of the original overreaction study were also challenged on the basis of the well-
known January effect.  The critique by Zarowin (1990) includes substantial discussion of 
seasonality in the overreaction phenomenon.  This explanation is supported by Pettengill and 
Jordan (1990), who show that almost half of the average cumulative abnormal return for the 
year in their 90-stock loser portfolio is generated in January.6
 
  Similarly, Chopra, Lakonishok 
and Ritter (1992) demonstrate that the overreaction effect was “disproportionately 
concentrated in January [pp. 249].”   In order to study the consequences of the January effect 
in combination with the three-factor pricing model, and to ensure the robustness of the tests of 
persistence of the overreaction anomaly, our models were adjusted to allow for a January 
coefficient.  The three-factor model with the January coefficient is specified: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] tiiitititftmiitfti HMLSMBRRRR ,,,,, εθγησβα ++++−+=−   (2) 
 
Results from these tests are presented in Table III, and show that the loser stocks are still 
small, distressed stocks and the January effect only has a marginal influence on some of the 
portfolios.  Interestingly, for the winner portfolios, the market beta coefficients appear to be 
capturing the majority of the returns from these portfolios, and the January effect is not 
statistically significant in any portfolios.  The explanatory power of the models increases only 
marginally with the addition of January, in the loser portfolios by 3.4% and in the winner 
portfolios by only 0.3%. 
                                                 
5 These results are available on request. 
6 De Bondt and Thaler (1987) concede that they have no satisfactory explanation for the January effects. 
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Table III 
Three-Factor Regressions of Performance for a 50 stock portfolio 
against a geometric average index, with January Coefficient, for the full study period 
Fama French 3-factor regressions for monthly excess returns on equal-weighted CRSP portfolios of 50 stocks 
formed on the basis of past returns: Non-overlapping portfolios for the period January 1933 to December 
2003.  Intercept estimates with t statistics (the regression coefficient divided by its standard error) from the 
Fama French 3-Factor model: 
(Ri,t - Rft)= αi + βi(Rmt - Rft) + σSMBt + ηHMLt + γi(θi) + εi,t 
where the dummy variable θ is set to 1 for January and 0 for all other months.  The regression R2’s are 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Statistical significance is denoted at: 1% 
- **;   5% - *; 10% - #. 
Sort Period Test Period 
Losers 
α βi σSMB ηHML γJAN Adj R2 
3 3 -0.002 1.086** 0.618 0.501# 0.068# 0.809 
  (-0.586) (7.698) (1.505) (1.732) (1.834)  
3 4 0.004 0.913** 1.507** 0.750** 0.097 0.775 
  (0.231) (8.397) (6.354) (3.252) (1.556)  
3 5 0.000 0.962** 1.543** 0.806** 0.096* 0.770 
  (-0.296) (8.946) (7.483) (4.272) (2.489)  
4 5 0.000 1.178** 0.461* 0.520** 0.094* 0.822 
  (-0.102) (10.189) (2.063) (2.590) (2.069)  
5 5 -0.001 1.069** 0.485^ 0.536* 0.049 0.797 
  (-0.086) (9.030) (1.936) (2.488) (1.417)  
Sort Period Test Period 
Winners 
α βi σSMB ηHML γJAN Adj R2 
3 3 -0.001 1.136** -0.082 -0.289 -0.016 0.861 
  (-0.222) (12.16) (-0.746) (-1.533) (-1.030)  
3 4 -0.003 1.193** 0.816** 0.105 -0.008 0.877 
  (-0.82) (14.549) (5.570) (1.312) (-0.574)  
3 5 -0.001 1.154** 0.701** 0.091 -0.012 0.888 
  (-0.418) (18.157) (6.320) (1.474) (-0.958)  
4 5 -0.002 1.153** -0.280* -0.276* -0.024 0.895 
  (-0.581) (18.433) (-2.407) (-2.345) (-1.283)  
5 5 -0.001 1.191** -0.271* -0.250# -0.017 0.896 
    (-0.353) (17.743) (-2.066) (-1.869) (-1.625)   
 
E. Robustness Tests 
The focus of our study so far, has been on the DT non-overlapping portfolios.  Portfolio 
managers are able to more effectively operationalize the contrarian strategy by forming 
portfolios on the basis of overlapping or rolling windows.  Additionally, it is recognised that 
properly specified tests of time series data can achieve greater efficiency by the use of 
overlapping data.7
                                                 
7 In his work on testing the efficient market hypothesis, Gilbert (1986) recognized the importance of using a full sample of 
overlapping data, along with the inherent problems of heteroskedasticity.   
  In order to account the problem of autocorrelation that overlapping 
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observations induces, all results are appropriately modified via the heteroskedasticity and 
autocovariance consistent estimator of Newey and West (1987) in order to obtain 
asymptotically valid hypothesis tests.  Table IV reports the average results for the three-factor 
model rolling windows tests carried out on all the portfolio combinations previously 
discussed.8
 
   
TABLE IV 
Rolling Window Tests of Robustness  for the Three-factor model 
Fama French 3-factor regressions for monthly excess returns on equal-weighted CRSP 
portfolios averaged across 20, 35 and 50 stocks formed on the basis of past returns: Rolling 
Window Portfolios for the period January 1933 to December 2003.  Intercept estimates with t 
statistics (the regression coefficient divided by its standard error) from the Fama French 3-
Factor model: 
(Ri,t - Rft )= αi + βi(Rmt - Rft) + σSMBt + ηHMLt + εi,t. 
The standard errors are appropriately modified via the heteroskedasticity and autocovariance 
consistent estimator of Newey and West (1987) in order to obtain asymptotically valid 
hypothesis tests on the overlapping data.  The regression R2’s are adjusted for the degrees of 
freedom.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Statistical significance is denoted at: 1% - **;   5% - 
*; 10% - #.   
Sort Period Test Period 
Losers 
α βι σSMB ηHML Adj R2 
3 3 0.002 1.289** 0.799 0.861* 0.727 
  (-0.093) (6.406) (1.547) (2.026)  
3 4 0.003 0.961** 0.870* 1.013** 0.699 
  (-0.019) (6.803) (1.929) (3.296)  
3 5 0.002 0.994** 0.787* 0.985** 0.708 
  (-0.057) (8.032) (1.662) (3.676)  
4 5 0.001 1.204** 0.662^ 0.693* 0.738 
  (-0.027) (8.786) (1.835) (2.478)  
5 5 0.002 1.087** 0.689* 0.735** 0.706 
  (0.011) (8.447) (1.983) (2.586)  
Sort Period Test Period 
Winners 
α βι σSMB ηHML Adj R2 
3 3 -0.003 1.181** -0.120 -0.357^ 0.845 
  (-0.572) (10.729) (-0.630) (-1.760)  
3 4 -0.002 1.175** -0.863 -0.216^ 0.848 
  (-0.664) (12.746) (-0.922) (-1.743)  
3 5 -0.002 1.166** -0.856 -0.365^ 0.846 
  (-0.750) (14.32) (-0.958) (-1.879)  
4 5 -0.002 1.174** -0.167 -0.299* 0.855 
  (-0.683) (14.307) (-1.062) (-2.047)  
5 5 -0.001 1.121** -0.187 -0.258^ 0.826 
    (-0.603) (14.198) (-1.337) (-1.934)   
                                                 
8 That is, an average of the 20, 35, and 50 stock portfolios.  A full presentation of these tests would be too voluminous for this 
paper; however, the results presented in this section are representative of those obtained from the implementation of the 
individual tests of robustness. 
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These results show that an investor employing a contrarian investment strategy using rolling 
windows will only earn returns to compensate for the market risk of the portfolios, combined 
with the risks of small, value companies, as captured by the SMB and HML coefficients.9
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In revisiting the overreaction anomaly we have shown that implementing a contrarian strategy 
for U.S. stocks does not produce alpha.  The analysis suggests that the factors of size and 
value play a central role in explaining the future returns generated by a strategy of forming 
portfolios based on past returns.  Perhaps the most interesting finding is that past losers 
consistently load on the size and value factor at statistically significant levels, and at levels 
consistently higher then their winner counterparts.  Moreover, for past winners, this loading is 
primarily towards the value factor.  The long-term past winners either load negatively on the 
value factor at statistically significant levels, or produce no loadings other than on the market 
factor, confirming previous research that categorizes overreaction as a ‘loser-effect’ rather 
than a ‘loser-and-winner-effect’.  These conclusions remain robust, even after adjusting for 
the January effect.  Our study shows that portfolio managers could earn returns above the 
market by constructing portfolios based on the contrarian investment strategy; however this 
additional return would come simply at the expense of increased risk – a win for proponents 
of standard finance theory. 
 
                                                 
9 Such findings are corroborated by using the FF model, incorporating the impact of the January effect, which, again for 
reasons of space, are not shown here, but are available on request. 
13 
APPENDIX A. CONSTRUCTING CONTRARIAN PORTFOLIOS 
The first stage of our study we follow an approach almost identical to that of DT, who 
demonstrate that most reversal evidence is contained in portfolios constructed for a 3-year 
time frame.  We use data on stock returns from January 1927 through December 2003 for all 
stocks listed on the CRSP tapes.  We follow the steps: 
 
1. At every month-end, we rank all stocks according to their return above the market 
over the previous m months (period t-m + 1 to t) where t is on months. 
2. Winner and loser portfolios are formed conditional upon past excess returns, with the 
top 35 stocks (those with the greatest cumulative excess returns) forming the winner 
portfolio, and the bottom 35 stocks (those with the smallest cumulative excess returns) 
forming the loser portfolio. 
3. We then measure the return to each of these portfolios in every month for the next n 
months (period t + 1 to n + 1).  Over a n-year period, the cumulative abnormal 
(monthly) return (CAR) for each stock is calculated as: 
 
                                             ∑
=
=
36
1
,
n
nii ARCAR                                                 (3) 
 
where tiAR ,  is measured by i,1α . 
 
4. This step is repeated for all following non-coincident n-month periods.  Variations to 
the DT strategy that we use include non-equal values for m and n.   
5. The cumulative average residual returns of all securities in the portfolios are 
calculated for the following n months.  Following this, the average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACAR) are calculated for months t-m + 1 to t. T-statistics are then 
calculated to determine if these ACAR’s are statistically significant.  In summary, 
Figure 1 provides a ‘snapshot’ of the methodological approach central to the study.10
                                                 
10 See De Bondt and Thaler (1985) for a more detailed description of the portfolio formation technique. 
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Figure 1. Trading Method for Contrarian Investment Strategy 
 
 
In this study, we also examined the contrarian investment strategy with the following 
variations to Step 2: 
2a Portfolios were formed containing 20 stocks and 50 stocks. 
 
Additionally, our methodology acknowledges the numerous papers that have replicated, 
examined, extended and critiqued the original overreaction study by also conducting tests on 
many alternate portfolio compositions.11  These alternatives are not so much areas of 
criticism, rather a sensible procedure for providing more robust results.12
• portfolios that were examined on the basis of 20, 35 and 50 stocks; 
  To overcome the 
perceived measurement shortcomings in the earlier work our methodology includes: 
• portfolios that were formed for both symmetrical windows (e.g. 3 year sort; 3 year 
test), and non-symmetrical windows, (e.g. 3 year sort; 4, and 5 year test); and, 
• testing undertaken for the DT time period (1926-1982), the recent period (1983-
2003) and the full sample (1926-2003). 
                                                 
11 For example, Pettingill and Jordan (1990) examine 90 stock portfolios, Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) use 20 
stocks, many studies use decile portfolios, Levis and Liodakis (2001) examine top and bottom one-third, De Bondt and 
Thaler (1987) use 50 stocks and Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber (1999) use portfolios ranging from 10 to 40 stocks.  For sort 
and test periods, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) who use periods ranging from 1 to five years, Campbell and Limmack 
(1997) who maintain a three year sort period but test over 1 to 5 years, and Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber (1999) who use 
much smaller sort periods of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. 
12 In fact Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber (1999) concede the points made in Ball, Kothari & Shaken (1995) and, when 
referring to the original DT study, state that “profits may be illusory, a product of methodological and measurement problems 
[p104]”. 
Contrarian Sort Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portfolio Test Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n Months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n Months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Calculate the return of each stock for each month of the sort period 
• Subtract market return from stock return to provide excess return 
• Cumulate the abnormal returns over the sort period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Rank the stocks by cumulative abnormal returns of the sort period 
• Long the stocks with the lowest cumulative abnormal returns 
• Short the stocks with the highest cumulative abnormal returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t-n           (Month t-n to Month t-1)                   t                 (Month t to Month t+n-1)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n = 36, 48, 60                                                                                                                    time 
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